Intermediate public economics

Başlık:

Yazar:

Hindriks, Jean.

ISBN:

9780262083447

Ek Yazar:

Hindriks, Jean.

Yayım Bilgisi:

Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2006.

Fiziksel Tanım:

xvii, 724 p. : ill. ; 24 cm.

Contents:

An introduction to public economics -- Equilibrium and efficiency -- Public sector statistics -- Theories of the public sector -- Public goods -- Club goods and local public goods -- Externalities -- Imperfect competition -- Asymmetric information -- Voting -- Rent-seeking -- Optimality and comparability -- Inequality and poverty -- Commodity taxation -- Income taxation -- Tax evasion -- Fiscal federalism -- Fiscal competition -- Intertemporal efficiency -- Social security -- Economic growth.

Konu Terimleri:

Economâia del bienestar

Hacienda pâublica

Polâitica econâomica

âEconomie du bien-être.

Finances publiques.

Politique âeconomique.

âEconomie du bien-être

âEconomie publique

Imposition

Râepartition du revenu

Politique âeconomique

Modáele âeconomique

Finances publiques

Added Author:

Myles, Gareth D.

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Library	Materyal Türü	Barkod	Yer Numarası	Durum
Searching... Pamukkale Merkez Kütüphanesi	Kitap	0039676	HB846.5.H56 2006	Searching... Unknown

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This is a comprehensive and accessible text that covers the core topics of public economies as well as developments in political economy, information, games, multiple jurisdictions, and intertemporal issues.

Preface	p. xix
I Public Economics And Economic Efficiency
1 An Introduction to Public Economics	p. 3
1.1 Public Economics	p. 3
1.2 Methods	p. 3
1.3 Analyzing Policy	p. 5
1.4 Preview	p. 6
1.5 Scope	p. 9
Further Reading	p. 9
Exercises	p. 93
2 Equilibrium and Efficiency	p. 11
2.1 Introduction	p. 11
2.2 Economic Models	p. 11
2.3 Competitive Economies	p. 12
2.4 Efficiency of Competition	p. 24
2.5 Lump-Sum Taxation	p. 38
2.6 Discussion of Assumptions	p. 40
2.7 Summary	p. 41
Further Reading	p. 42
Exercises	p. 42
II Government
3 Public Sector Statistics	p. 49
3.1 Introduction	p. 49
3.2 Historical Development	p. 49
3.3 Composition of Expenditure	p. 55
3.4 Revenue	p. 61
3.5 Measuring the Government	p. 67
3.6 Conclusions	p. 69
Further Reading	p. 69
Exercises	p. 70
4 Theories of the Public Sector	p. 73
4.1 Introduction	p. 73
4.2 Justification for the Public Sector	p. 73
4.3 Public Sector Growth	p. 77
4.4 Excessive Government	p. 84
4.5 Conclusions	p. 93
Further Reading	p. 94
Exercises	p. 95
III Departures From Efficiency
5 Public Goods	p. 101
5.1 Introduction	p. 101
5.2 Definitions	p. 102
5.3 Private Provision	p. 103
5.4 Efficient Provision	p. 108
5.5 Voting	p. 110
5.6 Personalized Prices	p. 113
5.7 Mechanism Design	p. 117
5.8 More on Private Provision	p. 124
5.9 Fund-Raising Campaigns	p. 132
5.10 Conclusions	p. 136
Further Reading	p. 137
Exercises	p. 138
6 Club Goods and Local Public Goods	p. 143
6.1 Introduction	p. 143
6.2 Definitions	p. 144
6.3 Single-Product Clubs	p. 145
6.4 Clubs and the Economy	p. 151
6.5 Local Public Goods	p. 160
6.6 The Tiebout Hypothesis	p. 164
6.7 Empirical Tests	p. 167
6.8 Conclusions	p. 169
Further Reading	p. 169
Exercises	p. 170
7 Externalities	p. 175
7.1 Introduction	p. 175
7.2 Externalities Defined	p. 176
7.3 Market Inefficiency	p. 177
7.4 Externality Examples	p. 180
7.5 Pigouvian Taxation	p. 188
7.6 Licenses	p. 191
7.7 Internalization	p. 194
7.8 The Coase Theorem	p. 195
7.9 Nonconvexity	p. 199
7.10 Conclusions	p. 201
Further Reading	p. 202
Exercises	p. 203
8 Imperfect Competition	p. 207
8.1 Introduction	p. 207
8.2 Concepts of Competition	p. 208
8.3 Market Structure	p. 209
8.4 Welfare	p. 212
8.5 Tax Incidence	p. 220
8.6 Specific and Ad valorem Taxation	p. 227
8.7 Regulation of Monopoly	p. 230
8.8 Regulation of Oligopoly	p. 235
8.9 Unions and Taxation	p. 238
8.10 Monopsony	p. 239
8.11 Conclusions	p. 241
Further Reading	p. 242
Exercises	p. 244
9 Asymmetric Information	p. 251
9.1 Introduction	p. 251
9.2 Hidden Knowledge and Hidden Action	p. 254
9.3 Actions or Knowledge?	p. 255
9.4 Market Unraveling	p. 256
9.5 Screening	p. 261
9.6 Signaling	p. 269
9.7 Moral Hazard (Hidden Action)	p. 277
9.8 Public Provision of Health Care	p. 285
9.9 Evidence	p. 289
9.10 Conclusions	p. 291
Further Reading	p. 291
Exercises	p. 293
IV Political Economy
10 Voting	p. 301
10.1 Introduction	p. 301
10.2 Stability	p. 301
10.3 Impossibility	p. 303
10.4 Majority Rule	p. 306
10.5 Alternatives to Majority Rule	p. 317
10.6 The Paradox of Voting	p. 322
10.7 The "Alabama" Paradox	p. 327
10.8 Conclusions	p. 329
Further Reading	p. 329
Exercises	p. 331
11 Rent-Seeking	p. 335
11.1 Introduction	p. 335
11.2 Definitions	p. 336
11.3 Rent-Seeking Games	p. 338
11.4 Social Cost of Monopoly	p. 346
11.5 Equilibrium Effects	p. 349
11.6 Government Policy	p. 352
11.7 Informative Lobbying	p. 356
11.8 Controlling Rent-Seeking	p. 361
11.9 Conclusions	p. 362
Further Reading	p. 363
Exercises	p. 364
V Equity And Distribution
12 Optimality and Comparability	p. 369
12.1 Introduction	p. 369
12.2 Social Optimality	p. 370
12.3 Lump-Sum Taxes	p. 373
12.4 Impossibility of Lump-Sum Taxes	p. 375
12.5 Non-Tax Redistribution	p. 380
12.6 Aspects of Pareto-Efficiency	p. 382
12.7 Social Welfare Functions	p. 385
12.8 The Impossibility	p. 387
12.9 Interpersonal Comparability	p. 388
12.10 Comparability and Social Welfare	p. 392
12.11 Conclusions	p. 396
Further Reading	p. 397
Exercises	p. 399
13 Inequality and Poverty	p. 403
13.1 Introduction	p. 403
13.2 Measuring Income	p. 404
13.3 Equivalence Scales	p. 406
13.4 Inequality Measurement	p. 412
13.5 Poverty	p. 428
13.6 Conclusions	p. 435
Further Reading	p. 437
Exercises	p. 438
VI Taxation
14 Commodity Taxation	p. 443
14.1 Introduction	p. 443
14.2 Deadweight Loss	p. 444
14.3 Optimal Taxation	p. 447
14.4 Production Efficiency	p. 451
14.5 Tax Rules	p. 453
14.6 Equity Considerations	p. 460
14.7 Applications	p. 462
14.8 Efficient Taxation	p. 467
14.9 Public Sector Pricing	p. 469
14.10 Conclusions	p. 469
Further Reading	p. 470
Exercises	p. 471
15 Income Taxation	p. 477
15.1 Introduction	p. 477
15.2 Equity and Efficiency	p. 478
15.3 Taxation and Labor Supply	p. 479
15.4 Empirical Evidence	p. 483
15.5 Optimal Income Taxation	p. 486
15.6 Two Specializations	p. 493
15.7 Numerical Results	p. 499
15.8 Tax Mix: Separation Principle	p. 501
15.9 Voting over a Flat Tax	p. 503
15.10 Conclusions	p. 506
Further Reading	p. 506
Exercises	p. 508
16 Tax Evasion	p. 513
16.1 Introduction	p. 513
16.2 The Extent of Evasion	p. 514
16.3 The Evasion Decision	p. 516
16.4 Auditing and Punishment	p. 523
16.5 Evidence on Evasion	p. 526
16.6 Effect of Honesty	p. 529
16.7 Tax Compliance Game	p. 531
16.8 Compliance and Social Interaction	p. 534
16.9 Conclusions	p. 536
Further Reading	p. 536
Exercises	p. 537
VII Multiple Jurisdictions
17 Fiscal Federalism	p. 543
17.1 Introduction	p. 543
17.2 Arguments for Multi-level Government	p. 544
17.3 Optimal Structure: Efficiency versus Stability	p. 548
17.4 Accountability	p. 551
17.5 Risk Sharing	p. 554
17.6 Evidence on Decentralization	p. 559
17.7 Conclusions	p. 562
Further Reading	p. 563
Exercises	p. 564
18 Fiscal Competition	p. 569
18.1 Introduction	p. 569
18.2 Tax Competition	p. 569
18.3 Income Distribution	p. 584
18.4 Intergovernmental Transfers	p. 589
18.5 Evidence	p. 594
18.6 Conclusions	p. 597
Further Reading	p. 599
Exercises	p. 601
VIII Issues Of Time
19 Intertemporal Efficiency	p. 607
19.1 Introduction	p. 607
19.2 Overlapping Generations	p. 609
19.3 Equilibrium	p. 614
19.4 Optimality and Efficiency	p. 618
19.5 Testing Efficiency	p. 625
19.6 Conclusions	p. 626
Further Reading	p. 626
Exercises	p. 627
20 Social Security and Debt	p. 631
20.1 Introduction	p. 631
20.2 Types of System	p. 632
20.3 The Pensions Crisis	p. 634
20.4 The Simplest Program	p. 637
20.5 Social Security and Production	p. 639
20.6 Population Growth	p. 643
20.7 Sustaining a Program	p. 646
20.8 Ricardian Equivalence	p. 651
20.9 Social Security Reform	p. 653
20.10 Conclusions	p. 659
Further Reading	p. 660
Exercises	p. 661
21 Economic Growth	p. 665
21.1 Introduction	p. 665
21.2 Exogenous Growth	p. 666
21.3 Endogenous Growth	p. 679
21.4 Policy Reform	p. 685
21.5 Empirical Evidence	p. 688
21.6 Conclusions	p. 693
Further Reading	p. 694
Exercises	p. 696

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