Mevcut:*
Library | Materyal Türü | Barkod | Yer Numarası | Durum |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Searching... Pamukkale Merkez Kütüphanesi | Kitap | 0023538 | JC578.R37 1996 | Searching... Unknown |
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Özet
Özet
Revising and continuing the idea of justice and fairness in A Theory of Justice,Rawls poses the question of how a stable and just society of free and equal citizens can live in concord when deeply divided by reasonable and incompatible doctrines. With its distinctive form of liberalism----resting on an idea of free public reason---- Political Liberalismyields new insights into the question of justice in our pluralistic society.
Author Notes
John Rawls, professor of philosophy at Harvard University, had published a number of articles on the concept of justice as fairness before the appearance of his magnum opus, A Theory of Justice (1971). While the articles had won for Rawls considerable prestige, the reception of his book thrust him into the front ranks of contemporary moral philosophy. Presenting a Kantian alternative to conventional utilitarianism and intuitionism, Rawls offers a theory of justice that is contractual and that rests on principles that he alleges would be accepted by free, rational persons in a state of nature, that is, of equality. The chorus of praise was loud and clear. Stuart Hampshire acclaimed the book as "the most substantial and interesting contribution to moral philosophy since the war."H. A. Bedau declared: "As a work of close and original scholarship in the service of the dominant moral and political ideology of our civilization, Rawls's treatise is simply without a rival." Rawls historically achieved two important things: (1) He articulated a coherent moral philosophy for the welfare state, and (2) he demonstrated that analytic philosophy was most capable of doing constructive work in moral philosophy. A Theory of Justice has become the most influential work in political, legal, and social philosophy by an American author in the twentieth century. (Bowker Author Biography)
Reviews (2)
Choice Review
Rawls's A Theory of Justice (CH, Sep'72) has been the pivotal work in political and moral philosophy for nearly 25 years. The present work consists of lectures and articles that clarify, defend, and revise his social contract theory of justice as fairness. The central concern is to revise the former account of political stability and the basis for a well-ordered society so that the fundamentals necessary for a liberal democratic society can be preserved despite wide differences in moral, religious, and philosophical doctrines which are to be expected among free, equal, and reasonable persons. Rawls's aim is to find an appropriately neutral political conception of justice which will attract an overlapping consensus among those who hold fundamentally different comprehensive moral and metaphysical views of persons and the good. Essential to the success of the project are Rawls's account of the reasonable and the rational (and what counts as reasonable differences) and his development of a list of primary goods (basic rights and liberties) for interpersonal comparisons. A not previously published lecture discusses how public reason can function amid a diversity of privately held doctrines. This is clearly important stuff, but anyone looking for specific answers will be disappointed. The book is highly abstract and theoretical, and except for a discussion of free speech and public reason as exemplified by the Supreme Court, examples are all too rare. However, the extensive revision of previously published works, the new material, and the many summaries and cross-references (plus a 28-page index) result in a coherent and readable account of many issues that are likely to remain at the center of political and philosophical debate. Most useful for advanced undergraduate and graduate students in political science and philosophy, but important enough to be in all academic libraries. R. H. Evans; University of MinnesotaDSDuluth
Library Journal Review
With the publication of his first book, A Theory of Justice ( LJ 4/1/72), Harvard philosopher Rawls catapulted himself into the first rank of contemporary political philosophers. His difficult and rewarding book offered an ingenious defense of the ``social contract'' as binding society together in the interests of not only justice but fairness. With Political Liberalism , his second book, Rawls responds to his critics by confronting the dilemmas inherent in developing a liberal theory of the good society that acknowledges cultural diversity and ethical pluralism. His approach is to ``describe the steps whereby a constitutional consensus on certain principles of basic political rights and liberties and on democratic procedures become an overlapping consensus.'' Not all readers will be satisfied by his solution, but they will be dazzled by his clarity of purpose and logic. Highly recommended for academic libraries.-- Kent Worcester, Social Science Research Council, New York (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Table of Contents
| Introduction |
| Introduction to the Paperback Edition |
| Part 1 Political Liberalism: Basic Elements |
| Lecture I Fundamental Ideas Addressing Two Fundamental Questions |
| The Idea of a Political Conception of Justice |
| The Idea of Society as a Fair System of Cooperation |
| The Idea of the Original Position |
| The Political Conception of the Person |
| The Idea of a Well-Ordered Society Neither a Community nor an Association |
| The Use of Abstract Conceptions |
| Lecture II The Powers of Citizens and Their Representation |
| The Reasonable and the Rational |
| The Burdens of Judgement Reasonable Comprehensive Doctrines |
| The Publicity Condition: Its Three Levels Rational Autonomy: Artificial not Political Full Autonomy: Political not Ethical |
| The Basis of Motivation in the Person Moral Psychology: Philosophical not Psychological |
| Lecture III Political Constructivism |
| The Idea of a Constructivist Conception Kant's Moral Constructivism Justice as Fairness as a Constructivist View |
| The Role of Conceptions of Society and Person |
| Three Conceptions of Objectivity Objectivity Independent of the Casual View of Knowledge |
| When Do Objective Reasons Exist, Politically Speaking? |
| The Scope of Political Constructivism |
| Part 2 Political Liberalism: Three Main Ideas |
| Lecture IV The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus |
| How is Political Liberalism Possible? |
| The Question of Stability Three Features of an Overlapping Consensus An Overlapping Consensus not Indifferent or Skeptical |
| A Political Conception Need Not Be Comprehensive Steps to Constitutional Consensus |
| Steps to Overlapping Consensus Conception and Doctrines: How Related |
| Lecture V Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good |
| How a Political Conception Limits Conceptions of the Good Goodness as Rationality |
| Primary Goods and Interpersonal Comparisons Primary Goods as Citizens' |
| Need Permissible Conceptions of the Good and Political Virtues Is Justice as Fairness Fair to Conceptions of the Good? |
| The Good of Political Society |
| That Justice as Fairness is Complete |
| Lecture VI The Idea of Public Reason |
| The Question and Forums of Public Right Public Reason and the Ideal of Democratic Citizenship Nonpublic Reasons |
| The Content of Public Reason |
| The Ideal of Constitutional Essentials |
| The Supreme Court as Exemplar of Public Reason Apparent Difficulties with Public Reason |
| The Limits of Public Reason |
| Part 3 Institutional Framework |
| Lecture VII The Basic Structure as Subject |
| First Subject of Justice Unity by Appropriate Sequence Libertarianism |
| Has No Special Role for the Basic Structure |
| The Importance of Background Justice |
| How the Basic Structure Affects Individuals Initial Agreement as Hypothetical and Nonhistorical |
| Special Features of the Initial Agreement |
| The Social Nature of Human Relationships Ideal Form for the Basic Structure |
| Reply to Hegel's Criticism |
| Lecture VIII The Basic Liberties and Their Priority |
| The Initial Aim of Justice as Fairness |
| The Special Status of Basic Liberties Conceptions of Person and Social Cooperation |
| The Original Position Priority of Liberties, I: Second Moral Power Priority of Liberties, II: First Moral Power Basic |
| Liberties not Merely Formal |
| A Fully Adequate Scheme of Basic Liberties |
| How Liberties Fit into One Coherent Scheme Free Political Speech |
| The Clear and Present Danger Rule Maintaining the Fair Value of Political |
| Liberties Liberties Connected with the Second Principle |
| The Role of Justice as Fairness |
| Lecture IX Reply to Habermas |
| Two Main Differences Overlapping Consensus and Justification |
| Liberties of the Moderns Versus the Will of the People |
| The Roots of the Liberties Procedural Versus Substantive Justice |
| Conclusion |